A week ago on the BinRev forums, a link was posted to a site that advertised the ability of the owners to hack any web-based email account. The link was to crackmails.net, however the same site was also available at yourhackers.net and hackpasswords.net (and perhaps more). The cost of this service was $100 per account, and (this is the great part) they would provide proof to you that they had hacked the target account with a screenshot of the inbox. Only then would you have to pay to receive the . You probably know what I was thinking when I read this already .
Here’s what the main page looked like:
I created a new email address on Gmail, with the name of a recent, but inactive, troll on the forums (so there’d be a few things in Google if they decided to do their research). Then, I filled out their order form with the information in the screenshot below, asking them to attack my own Gmail account, email@example.com . I had to give them something that didn’t look as much like a dummy account. Besides, it’s funnier this way. I had a lot of fun filling out the form asking why they should hack my Gmail account :
A short while later, I received an automated mail confirming my order (very professional!) in my dummy account’s inbox:
A full day later, I received the following phishing mail in my own Gmail account:
A plaintext copy of this email with full headers is available here for those who love to dig . I suppose they got around Gmail’s filters by being such a small operation. Does anyone really trust 123greetings-type emails anymore? I guess they must. Notice the domain name 123greetingsline.com, and the just-for-me unique URL. I tried modifying the URL, however it seems like they just generate the files as-needed when they receive an order.
Clicking on the link takes you to the phishing site itself:
Here’s the source for the login form:
For all the domain names they have, and all the web hosts they’ve been using, they had to resort to using a form mail script and leave the email addresses they use for harvesting out in the open. Hilarious.
If you’re a regular reader of this blog, you already know what I like to do with phishing sites (read up here if you’re not familiar with the technique I use to set up web bugs for catching phishers unaware). This one is no exception, so I set up a unique image and page on my site here to use with a web bug. Then I fill out the form fields with the html needed to try and render the image and link to the unique URL:
Once that was submitted, it actually went through the trouble of redirecting me to the real 123greetings for a nice card:
I set up tail and grep to look for a hit to either of the unique URLs I set up, and a day later I got the hit:
18.104.22.168 - - [23/Oct/2007:12:23:19 -0400] "GET /XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX>HAY</a> HTTP/1.1" 404 245 "http://desigubshup.com:2095/horde/imp/message.php?index=245" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.0.04506; InfoPath.2)"
So, here you have the IP address (resolves to one of btcentralplus.com’s customers), which at a glance didn’t appear to be running any sort of open proxy, a referral URL revealing where and how they’re checking their mail (there might be somewhere around 244 other victims, judging from the mail ID), and a nice long user agent string. Judging by the mangled end of the request, my web bugs didn’t render very well within IMP, however the phisher was dumb enough to click on the link anyway. This is the reason I try to put HTML links in along with normal image-based web bugs, and you’d be amazed at how often this happens.
I sent a couple of emails to them inquiring about the status of my order. Unfortunately, I haven’t heard back from them. As of a day or two ago, the sites they were advertising their services on look like this:
I’m sure they’re not very happy about that. Maybe they’ll find this post and leave us a comment bringing us up to speed on their situation .